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Introduction 
 
The cleavage concept plays a central role in the literature on the formation of European 
party systems as well as in accounts of contemporary voting behaviour. This latter 
literature, however, has produced contradictory results. Whereas some authors claim 
that the structuring power of the traditional cleavages has veined, others can show that 
voters’ preferences continue to be determined by their socio-structural characteristics. I 
argue that both views are problematic. The first – exemplified by most studies of 
voting behaviour – derives from an overly static understanding of cleavages, whereas 
the second, pioneered by Kitschelt (1994), has difficulties specifying how newly found 
structural conflicts relate to the historical cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967). 
Consequently, while the cleavage concept’s major strength lies in its ability to 
bridge the macro- and micro-levels of analysis, contradictions in the understanding of 
the concept itself limit its analytical usefulness. This paper addresses a number of 
conceptual issues and proposes a new analytical approach to studying the interplay 
between historical cleavages and the conflicts structuring competition in party systems 
at a given moment. Building on the assumption that existing cleavages “organize out” 
certain conflicts (Schattschneider 1975) and thereby condition the room for the 
emergence of new cleavages, I propose an analytical model that distinguishes several 
types of divide that leave varying room for the manifestation of new structural 
divisions. Apart from addressing conceptual issues, the paper therefore develops a 
model that helps to explain why the leeway for political agency in cleavage formation 
is larger in some situations than in others.  
The paper is organized as follows. In order to lay the ground for more fruitful 
empirical applications of the cleavage concept, I start in the first section by addressing 
conceptual issues. Most importantly, the concept requires a more adequate 
understanding of the role of collective identity in the initial mobilization as well as in 
the subsequent perpetuation of cleavages. Although it is often alluded to with reference 
to Bartolini and Mair’s (1990) widely acclaimed definition of a cleavage, collective 
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identity is often unduly neglected in empirical applications. This is problematic for an 
understanding of when new cleavages may emerge because historically, structural 
conflicts have only developed into cleavages under rather specific conditions that 
facilitate the formation of collective identities. The diverging paths of party system 
formation in Latin America underscore this point. While the general neglect of the 
collective identity aspect of cleavages in empirical analyses (with the exception of 
Knutsen and Scarbrough’s 1995 treatment) in part derives from the scarcity of 
adequate data, shortcomings can on the other hand be traced to a lack of appropriate 
analytical tools. For this reason, and building on concepts from social psychology, I 
conceptualize collective identities as formed by individual group attachments. Because 
each individual has multiple group identities, the relative salience of these attachments 
determines the potentials for parties’ efforts at mobilizing new structural divisions. 
The second section seeks to develop a better understanding of how cleavages are 
perpetuated over long time-spans, and therefore takes issue with Lipset and Rokkan’s 
(1967) famous “freezing hypothesis”. Drawing on Sartori’s (1968) early criticism, I 
suggest to shift focus from the homogeneity of a cleavage’s underlying structural basis 
to the process in which party competition itself reproduces collective identities and 
thereby stabilizes cleavages. This is based on the insight that political conflict has 
group-binding functions (Coser 1956). In order to empirically determine the evolving 
nature of cleavages, their political manifestation in terms of the programmatic lines of 
conflict underlying oppositions in party systems should be taken into account, on the 
par with the social structural, collective identity, and organizational elements 
suggested by Bartolini and Mair (1990). Only by paying attention to the policy content 
of party competition can we determine to which degree the cleavages identified by 
Lipset and Rokkan have been transformed by new divisions that have appeared in 
Western Europe since the late 1960s (Kitschelt 1994, 1995; Kriesi et al. 2006). 
In the third section, I combine the insights from the foregoing parts of the paper and 
develop an analytical model that combines the capacity of cleavages to structure voting 
decisions with an analysis of their political content and the degree of polarization they 
entail. To determine the space available for the emergence of new conflicts, different 
types of cleavage are distinguished using three elements: The distances in parties’ 
issue-positions across a cleavage, the degree of correspondence in the preferences of 
the voters of these parties, and the stability of voter-party alignments. This results in a 
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typology of different types of divide that have varying consequences for the 
mobilization of new conflicts. 
While the main focus of this paper is conceptual, I present some empirical results in 
the final section. These are primarily intended to illustrate the applicability of the 
model. The results come from an analysis that was undertaken to explain the rise of 
right-wing populist parties in France and Switzerland, and their lack of success in 
Germany (Bornschier 2007). My hypotheses is that these parties have emerged as a 
consequence of the country-specific mobilization of a new cultural line of conflict that 
opposes libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of 
community and justice. This antagonism has replaced the religious cleavage as the 
second major lines of conflict alongside the state-market cleavage in Western 
European party systems. To analyze the programmatic content of party competition, I 
rely on data based on a sentence-by-sentence coding of the newspaper coverage of 
election campaigns in six countries (Bornschier 2005, Kriesi et al. 2006). By means of 
this data, the axes structuring political competition are determined using 
Multidimensional Scaling (MDS). Each cleavage is then examined separately using the 
model described above. On the demand side, voters’ positions along these lines of 
conflict are measured using survey data. A comparison of the 1970s and the 1990s 
then provides the opportunity to assess how the programmatic content of the traditional 
cleavages has been transformed, as well as to identify which of the theoretically 
developed types of cleavages current oppositions correspond to. 
 
 
The Role of Collective Identities in Cleavage-Formation 
 
Across Europe, the twin processes of the national and the industrial revolutions have 
constituted “critical junctures” determining subsequent political development, and 
have led to long-term alignments between social groups and political parties. In Lipset 
and Rokkan’s model (Lipset, Rokkan 1967, Rokkan 2000), the national and the 
industrial revolutions have each resulted in the establishment of two cleavages. 
Drawing on this European historical experience, Bartolini and Mair (1990: 213-220) 
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have offered a definition of a cleavage that has become widely accepted. According to 
this conceptualisation, a political divide must comprise three elements to constitute a 
cleavage: (1) A social-structural element, such as class, religious denomination, status, 
or education, (2) an element of collective identity of this social group, and (3) an 
organizational manifestation in the form of collective action or a durable organization 
of the social groups concerned. Going beyond these three constituting elements of a 
cleavage, it should be noted that the term cleavage is usually reserved for relationships 
which exhibit a certain stability. A cleavage constitutes a durable pattern of political 
behaviour linking social groups and political organizations. This pattern is reproduced 
over generations of voters, and possibly beyond the conflicts which originally brought 
the respective parties into being. Cleavages entail collective political identities and 
organizational loyalties that determine individual political behaviour, and which are 
not easily broken down or diluted by new political movements.  
As the definition by Bartolini and Mair (1990) noted above makes clear, the 
collective identities of the social groups divided by a conflict are a constituting 
element of a cleavage. As far as the initial mobilization of a cleavage is concerned, the 
reasons for this are straightforward. Tarrow (1992: 177) states that “If the social 
movement research of the last two decades has shown anything, it is that grievances 
are not sufficient to trigger collective action, that this requires someone who can take 
advantage of political opportunities, develop organizations of some kind, and interpret 
grievances and mobilize consensus around them” (emphasis added). There are 
differing usages of the term collective identity, but I propose here to understand it as 
the shared beliefs, values and ideologies, as well as the shared definition of the 
membership criteria and of the boundaries of a group. In a similar vein, Eisenstadt and 
Giesen (1995: 74) conceive collective identity as “produced by the social construction 
of boundaries“. These divisions, according to the authors, might be related to control 
over resources and social differentiation, but they are nonetheless dependent upon 
symbolic codes of distinction. For reasons which will become apparent later on, I 
propose to keep analytically distinct the second and the third elements of a cleavage 
mentioned above, namely, the element of collective identity and that of political 
organization. 
The space for new political conflicts is thus conditioned by the existing cleavage 
structure. The relationship between the last of the four historical cleavages and the 
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three historically older ones illustrates this nicely. The class divide, contrary to the 
other cleavages, has proven to be universally polarizing across Europe. But despite 
representing the main commonality of European party systems, its impact has been far 
from uniform in the different countries. On the one hand, this is due to the country-
specific opportunities for alliances with other political movements. More directly 
relevant for the present discussion is the fact that the class cleavage’s strength as well 
as the make-up of its social basis have been heavily determined by the older cleavages 
and the loyalties and identities that they entailed (Rokkan 2000: 277-412, Bartolini 
2000: Ch. 8). Workers’ parties thus found their mobilization space constrained by prior 
mobilization efforts of the religious, nationalist and agrarian political movements. As a 
consequence, the share of the working class voting for left parties varies heavily across 
countries, and so does the social structural homogeneity of the electorate mobilized by 
the left (Bartolini 2000: 497). 
 
Social Structure and Collective Identities: An Individual-Level Reading of the 
Preconditions of Cleavage-Mobilization 
 
In social psychological terms, the political mobilization of a social group requires its 
members to interpret conflicts of interest or of ideological outlook in intergroup as 
opposed to interpersonal terms. According to social identity theory, this is achieved by 
the cognitive process of depersonalisation (Stets and Burke 2000: 231-2, Tajfel 1981). 
Tajfel (1981: Ch. 4) has provided an outline of the conditions for interpersonal to 
become intergroup behaviour: In contexts allowing for individual social mobility from 
one social position to another, behaviour is most likely to remain interpersonal, since 
individual action in order to change one’s situation is possible. Intergroup behaviour, 
on the other hand, requires what Tajfel calls social change beliefs, which emerge only 
when group boundaries are not easily transgressed, or when the existing social 
stratification system does not enjoy legitimacy. This mechanism is in many ways 
similar to Hirschman’s (1970) concepts of  “exit” and “voice”, which play a central 
role in Bartolini’s (2005) analysis of the preconditions of internal cleavage structuring, 
namely, the drawing up of the outside borders of the polity in the process of nation-
building.  
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In Tajfel’s account, social mobility and social change beliefs form a continuum. The 
further beliefs are away from the “social change” end of the continuum, the more 
“creativity” is necessary for the fostering of ideologies that make individuals act not as 
individuals but as group members. In other words, conflicts are only interpreted in 
group terms if intergroup mobility is low, because these conditions make probable the 
identification of individuals with the group they belong to. On the other hand, if social 
mobility is perceived to be high, the symbolic construction of boundaries will be much 
more difficult. Lipset (1960) has employed a similar reasoning to explain why class-
based political action has been common in European countries, while no socialist party 
emerged in the United States, arguing that differences in interclass social mobility 
between the United States and Europe go a long way in explaining this fact.  
At the individual level, identification with a social group or category is the 
individual-level equivalent to a collective identity, as Klandermans and de Weerd 
(2000) have suggested. Because a political mobilization of group interests is dependent 
upon the prior existence of individuals’ identification with the group, the potential for 
collective identity formation of a social group or category is crucial in determining the 
chances for the political mobilization of structurally rooted grievances. Such collective 
identities or group identifications are pre-political and do not necessarily include 
definitions of political action necessary to achieve a group’s interests. In a similar vein, 
Klandermans and de Weerd (2000: 70) point out that collective identities remain 
“neutral” unless they are politicised. 
In this respect, the concept of the “mobilization potential” of a social movement in 
fruitful. Klandermans (1997: 16) defines it as consisting of the citizens who could 
theoretically be mobilized by a movement, who share certain values and beliefs, and 
who are sympathetic to a certain collective action frame (see also Kriesi and 
Duyvendak 1995: 5-10). Combining this with the definition of a cleavage employed 
above, the mobilization potential of any political opposition – be it a new conflict or 
one already represented by the party system – consists of two elements: (1) Groups of 
individuals defined by objective social conditions or cultural oppositions (e.g., 
religion), and (2) sharing a collective identity, meaning that members identify with the 
group in question. While the first of these element identifies structural potentials, 
based on social structural or cultural distinctiveness, it is only the second element 
which involves the shift to collective action potentials, which can be mobilized by 
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political actors. The relationships between the basic concepts laid out so far are 
summarized in Table 1. Orientations towards political action, which I have not 
discussed so far, are only relevant for the third stage of a cleavage, namely the element 
of political organization. It is here that political actors come into play which can 
mobilize political potentials in various ways and in different political arenas. As a 
result, individuals develop loyalties to political organizations such as parties, and the 
conflict the party represents becomes part of their ideological schema, as will be 
argued later on. The significance of individual-level role designations and value 
patterns at the collective level will be discussed later on in the course of this section.  
 
Table 1: Political mobilization at the individual and collective levels 
 
Elements of a cleavage Social structure Collective identity Political organization 
Individual-level 
equivalents 
Grievances/interests 
Roles 
Ways of life/values 
Group identification/ 
Social identity 
Value patterns 
Political alignments 
Organizational loyalties 
Ideological schemas 
Resulting potential Structural potential Collective action 
potential 
Political action 
 
 
Collective Identity and the Individual: The Problem of Multiple Group Membership 
 
Evidently, even if the members of a structural category share a collective 
consciousness – implying that a collective action potential is present – not all of them 
are likely to be mobilized in terms of the grievances, interests, or ways of life 
characteristic of this group. This is, of course, partly due to the fact that they have to be 
reached by mobilization efforts. A more crucial factor accounting for differences 
between collective action potentials and political action, however, is that individuals 
are rarely members of one social category or structural potential alone. Hence, even 
people similarly located in employment terms may variably think of themselves for 
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example as working-class, as catholic, or as belonging to a certain ethnic community, 
to name just a few possibilities. If it were not for this fact, the assertion that interest-
based mobilization always requires the prior construction of a collective identity may 
seem too starkly put. If only one group membership were relevant for an individual, its 
preferences might be clear-cut enough to take a political decision based on individual 
interest. But in most real-world political situations, decisions are not that simple, and 
whenever more than one group membership is salient, political behaviour will be more 
difficult to predict. 
From a historical macro perspective, scholars working within the cleavage-
perspective have of course been sensitive to the effects of cross-cutting cleavages and 
the cross-pressures resulting from them, as mentioned (Rokkan 2000, Bartolini 2000: 
Ch. 8). But at the individual level, there are very few accounts that provide tools to 
explain why some members of a social category are mobilized on the basis of that 
category while others are not. It is therefore helpful to turn to social psychological 
theories that provide the tools to grasp collective identities at the individual level. In 
social identity theory, a distinction is made between those aspects of a person’s 
identity that are individual, and those that are social. Originally developed by Henri 
Tajfel (1981: Ch. 5), this distinction is captured concisely by Monroe et al. (2000: 421) 
as follows: “Broadly defined, social identity refers to the social categories, attributes, 
or components of the self-concept that are shared with others and therefore define 
individuals as being similar to others. In contrast, personal identity is made up of those 
attributes that mark an individual as distinct from all others.”  
Social identity, in other words, refers to those parts of an individual’s identity that 
are derived from their identification with various social groups. While collective 
identity is a socially constructed collective belief, group identification is situated at the 
individual level, and refers to the appropriation of collective beliefs (Klandermans, de 
Weerd 2000: 75, Klandermans 1997). Potentially, individuals can have a wide variety 
of social identities or groups they identify with: citizens sharing their religious 
affiliation, their professional group or their social class, their nationality, or the circle 
of all Europeans, to note just a few examples which are potentially relevant for 
politics. To the extent that the members feel attached to these groups or categories, 
they form collective action potentials, as argued earlier.  
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If all of the group identifications referred to above were of the same strength, 
equivalent political potentials would result. Which identification would prevail in 
political action would merely be determined by the stimuli of a given situation that 
activates a specific identification. But in practice, it is quite likely that people will 
show different intensities in their identification with various groups. Stryker (2000), in 
one of the rare applications of social psychological concepts to political mobilization, 
criticizes social identity theory for not being able to account for differentials in social 
movement participation by individuals who are similarly located in structural terms 
and ideologically like-minded. Stryker’s (1980, 2000) identity theory offers conceptual 
tools to address the question. Although differences between identity theory and social 
identity theory exist, I will follow recent claims underlining the potential in linking the 
two theories (Stets and Burke 2000, Hogg and Ridgeway 2003, Brewer 2001, Burke 
2004), and offer an account that integrates them.  
Identity theory builds on sociological role theory and posits that “Persons 
potentially have as many [social] identities as sets of role relations in which they 
participate” (Stryker 2000: 28). Roles are behavioural expectations tied to positions in 
the social structure. A position, on the other hand, is any socially recognized category 
of actors. These can be defined by occupation, by status, or simply by characteristics 
such as “rich man”, “poor man”, “intellectual”, and so on, in the examples that Stryker 
gives. The expectations attached to positions are of course social per se, but another 
important feature clearly making them social is that they relate to counter-roles – 
employer vs. employee being an example (Stryker 1980: 57-59). Identities are 
internalised role designations whose salience can vary: Contrary to social identity 
theory, which posits that they are either activated or not activated due to the features of 
a specific situation, identity theory holds that identities have different probabilities of 
being activated (Stets and Burke 2000: 229-30). Identities can be conceived as being 
ordered into a salience hierarchy, “such that the higher the identity in that hierarchy, 
the more likely that the identity will be invoked in a given situation or in many 
situations” (Stryker 1980: 60-1).  
Stryker’s identity theory is based on a symbolic interactionalist framework whose 
premise is that people’s actions are determined by the way they interpret situations. In 
his version of the theory, however, Stryker gives more weight to social structure than 
to interpretive processes in accounting for an individual’s social behaviour, though 
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sticking to the premises of symbolic interactionalism: “Thus, if the social person is 
shaped by interaction, it is social structure that shapes the possibilities for interaction 
and so, ultimately, the person” (Stryker 1980: 66). In other words, the salience 
hierarchy of identities is influenced by an individual’s networks of relationships and 
commitments to social groups. This is how society and social structure are reflected in 
an individual’s self-concept.  
The relevance of these theories for political mobilization can readily be seen. 
According to Stryker (2000), differences in political mobilization within social 
categories can be accounted for not simply by emphasizing recruitment processes or 
campaigning effects, but also by individuals’ linkages to various social networks – 
read: other group identifications – which pull them away from being mobilized in 
terms of a specific group membership. One of the prototypical historical examples for 
this process in cleavage theory is the catholic worker who has to chose between class 
solidarity and his belonging to a religious community – both constituting possibly 
salient social identities. From a cleavage perspective, then, social psychological 
accounts linking identity and social structure are interesting because they allow us to 
study differences in identity-conceptions within social categories without ending in a 
purely social constructionist account. 
If cleavages are formed by the interplay between structural or cultural similarities 
and the development of a collective consciousness of social groups, as I have 
suggested, then their continued salience must result from the stability of these 
collective identities. Put differently, they require stability in the salience hierarchy of 
identities of the members of those social groups divided by a cleavage. In the 
following, I address the question of how cleavages are perpetuated and how much 
room they leave for the politicization of new conflicts, and suggest that an important 
mechanism perpetuating collective identities and individual-level group attachments is 
political conflict.  
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The Perpetuation and Transformation of Cleavages and  
Political Alignments 
 
Differing interpretations of the “freezing-hypothesis” 
 
„Despite more or less thirty years of close reading by countless scholars in a 
variety of different fields, and despite what is now a genuinely voluminous 
literature seeking to explore and often test the ramifications of the so-called 
»freezing hypothesis«, there still remains a marked degree of confusion about what 
precisely was believed by Lipset and Rokkan to have settled into place by the 
1920s” (Mair 2001: 27). 
 
The mobilization of the historical cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), in 
processes lasting to the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, have 
given birth to the modern party systems in Europe. Subsequently, the full mobilization 
of European electorates led to a “freezing” of the major party alternatives. As the 
historical record shows, existing cleavages condition the room for the emergence of 
new conflicts. However, interpretations of the sources of the stability of European 
party systems differ, and so do notions of what promotes the stability of the basic lines 
of division underlying these systems. This discord is mirrored in the discussion on 
whether or not the classical class and religious cleavages have maintained their 
structuring power, or if their force is waning.  
There is a basic contradiction between those strands of research that understand 
cleavages as (historically rooted) alliances between certain social structural groups and 
political parties (e.g., Franklin et al. 1992) and those who conceive cleavages as 
dimensions of conflict that underlie interactions in party system (e.g., Bartolini, Mair 
1990, Mair 1997). A third strand (e.g., Evans 1999a) is concerned with new structural 
divisions that shape voting behaviour, but has difficulties in showing how newly found 
antagonisms relate to the historical cleavages of the Lipset-Rokkan account. In a 
similar vein, scholars approaching the question “top down”, with a focus on parties’ 
adaptation to new societal demand and structures (e.g., Kitschelt 1994), fail to 
accommodate within their models the interaction or clash of established political 
identities and new political conflicts which transform the political contents of the 
existing cleavage structure. 
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Contrary to the analysis of the genesis of European party systems, the mechanisms 
accounting for their ensuing long-term stability have not been analyzed in detail in the 
original Lipset-Rokkan article, and not in Rokkan’s later work (Rokkan 2000). 
Empirical tests of the continuing validity of the freezing-hypothesis have proceeded 
along two main lines, as Mair (2001: 28-33) points out. As we will see, they are based 
on differing interpretations of what exactly “froze” into place in the 1920s: (1) A first 
possibility is to track the evolution of social-structural basis of a cleavage, the strategy 
pursued by scholars studying the social structural determinants of voting behaviour. In 
Bartolini’s (2000: 24) words, the focus here is on the social homogeneity of the 
structural basis of cleavages. Mair (2001: 30) criticizes this understanding as 
unrealistic because the hypothesis could only be correct if society itself is “frozen”. 
Since social structure has evidently changed a great deal since the 1920s, the long-term 
stability of party systems, revealed by Bartolini and Mair’ (1990) analysis, must be due 
to something else than stable patterns of linkage between social strata and political 
parties. If party systems retain their basic shape in the midst of an evolving society, 
then this can only be accounted for by the forming of new links between social groups 
and parties, which compensate the natural process of structural dealignment due to the 
declining number of religious and working class voters. This is in fact the reasoning 
put forward by Evans and his colleagues (Evans 1999a). But if the cleavages have 
been profoundly transformed, then it hardly makes sense to apply the freezing-
metaphor to the cleavages themselves. 
(2) The second strategy is to focus on the stability of party systems formed by the 
historical cleavages. Most of the work focusing on aggregate levels of electoral 
volatility falls into this category, such as Bartolini and Mair’s (1990) study. This 
perspective seeks to explain the persistence of parties beyond the conflicts that 
originally brought them into being. The fact that the links between social groups and 
parties are subject to change is at least implicitly taken as a given. They are not 
problematic, quite to the contrary: As Mair (2001) argues, for example, a long-term 
transformation of cleavages is actually the only possible explanation for the stability of 
European party systems evidenced in Bartolini and Mair (1990). Their constant 
adaptation helped parties survive in a profoundly changing environment.  
Upon closer reading, Lipset and Rokkan’s original formulation of the freezing 
hypothesis seems to conform more to the second interpretation just discussed than to 
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the first. Lipset und Rokkan (1990: 134) actually refer to the „freezing of the major 
party alternatives“, and not the cleavages themselves. They explicitly state, „[…] the 
party systems of the 1960s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage 
structures of the 1920s“ (ibid, emphasis mine). A frozen party system is thus 
equivalent to a structurally consolidated or institutionalized party system, in Sartori’s 
(1976) terms. The stronger a party system structures the expectations of actors over 
time – at the elite as well as at the mass level – the more it contributes to channelling 
old and new conflicts into established structures of competition. Mair also suggests 
such a nexus between expectations and structuration, in arguing that „Predictability 
then becomes a surrogate of structuration: the more predictable a party system is, the 
more it is a system as such, and hence the more institutionalized it has become. This is 
also what freezing is about“ (Mair 2001: 38). 
A partial explanation for the confusion as to the exact meaning of the freezing 
metaphor may actually lie in the influential definition of a cleavage put forward by 
Bartolini and Mair, which can only be read as putting great emphasis on the social 
structural homogeneity of parties’ electorates. However, in other instances, the authors 
themselves are much less strict in their understanding of cleavages. This applies to 
Mair’s (1997) later work as well as to Bartolini (2000), who accepts a long-term 
decline in the social structural homogeneity of a party’s electorate as quite natural. 
Hence, Bartolini and Mair’s definition, emphasizing the social structure-collective 
identity-organization linkage, seems much more adequate to analyze the conditions for 
the initial mobilization of cleavages than for answering the question to which degree 
historical cleavages structure politics today. Since studying the contemporary political 
relevance of cleavages is my aim, I will argue that it does not suffice to focus on social 
structure and on the stability of partisan alignments, but that we also have to identify 
the concrete political conflicts carried out in party systems and how they are 
interpreted and processed along the lines of historical antagonisms reflected in 
cleavages. 
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The role of political conflict in the perpetuation of cleavages 
 
To the degree that political conflicts evolve around issues directly linked to the 
original cleavages, politics is likely to reinforce and sustain the underlying collective 
identities. Coser (1956) has emphasized the group-binding functions of conflict, while 
it has also repeatedly been pointed out that basic clusters of values and ensuing value 
identities are antagonistically related to one another. According to Wildavsky (1987: 
7), „conflict among cultures is a precondition of cultural identity“. Ongoing political 
conflict thus serves to highlight the boundaries of the group and to keep group 
identification salient at the level of the individual member. The structure of conflict 
represented by the party system thereby perpetuates the collective identifications 
underlying the cleavage structure. Sartori (1968) has argued, for example, that 
objective class positions are not automatically transposed into politics, but that it is the 
existence of a working-class party that turns objective class membership into 
subjective class consciousness. It needs to be emphasized, however, that it is not the 
working class party alone that keeps alive the subjective class-consciousness of the 
social constituency that once led to the mobilization of that party. Without an 
antagonist, this identification would lose much of its political relevance, and not being 
refreshed, would open the way to identifications on the basis of some other group 
membership. It is thus not parties themselves that reproduce collective identities, but 
the conflicts they carry out with other parties. In other words, it is the party system, 
defined as a „[...] system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition“ 
(Sartori 1976: 44) that reproduces collective identities.  
Political space can thus be imagined as structured by parties taking certain positions 
along the historical dividing lines. These established patterns of interaction within the 
party system serve to stabilize the collective identities underlying the dividing lines. 
Contrary to the argument put forward by Campbell et al. (1960: Ch. 7) and Converse 
(1969), then, it is not necessarily the long-term identification of social groups with a 
specific party that accounts for the stability of a party system over time, but rather the 
stability of the patterns of interaction between parties that perpetuates political 
alignments. Accordingly, party identification appears as the product of a genuinely 
political socialization process.  
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Party systems then reproduce themselves over time as new generations of voters are 
socialized into the existing structure of interaction, and come to interpret politics in 
terms of the prevailing pattern of oppositions. Thus, the configuration of the lines of 
conflict in a party system represents something like a cognitive schema that helps 
individuals to make sense of politics. A schema can be conceived as a „cognitive 
structure of organized prior knowledge, abstracted from experience with specific 
instances that guides the processing of new information and the retrieval of stored 
information“ (Conover, Feldman 1984: 96). According to the authors, one of the roles 
of schemas is to generate expectations against which reality is compared (ibid, p. 97), 
much like the notion of a frozen or an institutionalized party system developed in the 
preceding section. In the absence of patterned interactions, the party system provides 
no cognitive schema for the interpretation of politics. Accordingly, no stable links 
between social constituencies and parties will exist, and levels of volatility from one 
election to the next can be very high, indicating the absence of any form of structuring. 
Examples for such constellations are absent in Western Europe, but the experience 
outside Europe – looking at the contrasts between highly structured and fluid party 
systems in Latin America, for example – demonstrates that veritable party systems are 
the product of cleavages, and do not develop in other historical contexts. 
The notion that the socialization within a party system entails the development of a 
cognitive schema then helps to explain why cleavages, once formed, are so resistant to 
change, and how they can persist beyond the immediate conflicts that have brought the 
system into being in the first place. As Bartolini and Mair (1990: 218) put it, they offer 
individuals already existing alternatives for their social identities and political 
integration. At the same time, this does not mean that there is no change in the content 
of the conflicts carried out between parties. On the contrary, as Mair (1997) has 
insisted, the historical party organization’s remarkable resilience over time is precisely 
due to their ability to adapt to structural and cultural changes. Thus, while new 
political issues are for the most part interpreted and processed in terms of the 
established structure of conflict, there is by no means stability in the political content 
of conflict. Structures of oppositions may resemble those produced by the historical 
cleavages, but it is not the cleavages or the original conflicts as such that are 
perpetuated, but the shape of the party system. 
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At this point, it is obviously necessary to move from identities anchored in social 
structure and tightly bound to the social groups – whose mobilization initially 
produced a cleavage structure – to more genuinely political identities, which are partly 
a product of politics itself. This interpretation is in line with Sartori’s (1968) dictum 
that we have to conceive of the party system as an independent variable between the 
domains of social structure and politics. At a fine level of analysis, then, the partisan 
camps divided by a cleavage consist of social groups that have been mobilized into this 
opposition by virtue of the homogeneity of their life chances, their religious world-
view or their sectoral interests. Represented in the party system, however, are broader 
patterns of opposition, which are the result of multiple alliances between social groups 
in opposition to those with opposing interests or ideologies.  
 
The transformation of cleavages: Collective identities and realignments 
 
If new conflicts are usually somehow absorbed into the established structure of conflict 
without altering it, this does not mean that a party system will be capable of 
channelling all conflicts around new political issues. Whether this is the case depends 
on how easily new issues are reconcilable with the predominating antagonisms, or if 
they cut across them. If new issues divide the same social groups as the conflicts that 
have been prevailing so far, they will simply be taken up by parties and will result in a 
somewhat altered meaning or political content of the dominant lines of conflict within 
a party system. Just like voters, parties rely on ideologies to position themselves with 
respect to new issues (Budge 1994). However, if parties’ established electorates are 
divided concerning an issue that is new or was of minor salience hitherto, parties will 
try to avoid positioning themselves regarding this question. The obvious temptation to 
attract new voters by positioning themselves regarding controversial issues is tempered 
by the risks inherent of such a strategy. Parties are historical beings and “stand for 
something”, in Klingemann et al.’s (1994: 24) words, and this keeps them from 
abandoning those political positions that are closely associated with them. I take this to 
be the background of Schattschneider’s (1975) dictum of organization being the 
“mobilization of bias”, every form of organization being receptive to some conflicts 
but not to others. In times of “normal politics”, the party system is not particularly 
18 
responsive to new issues, because the established cleavage structure tends to 
“organize” issues cutting across established lines of division “out of politics”.  
This situation can change, however, in phases of realignment. If new issues cannot 
be integrated into the existing structure of conflict, and if one of the parties within the 
system – or a new party – takes them up, the other parties will have to take sides as 
well, and chances are that linkages between social groups and political parties are 
reconfigured. While old connections are weakened in a process of dealignment, new 
and salient issues may lead to the formation of new linkages. The latter processes are 
at the heart of the theory of political realignments (Dalton, Flanagan, Beck 1984, 
Martin 2000, Mayhew 2000). Small realignments may occur continuously, but 
according to Martin’s (2000) reformulation of the theory, when party systems adapt to 
new structures of conflict, this is usually a rather eruptive process, and can be traced to 
a number of “critical elections” characterized by higher levels of volatility 
accompanying the modification in party constituencies. This eruptiveness is precisely 
due to the inherent inertia of party systems as a consequence of their freezing along 
historical antagonisms, and the fact that they are not very responsive to new demands 
of the populace in times of “normal politics”. The latter in the theory of realignment 
denotes phases where the system is stable and where the prevailing alignments are not 
altered, despite events such as corruption scandals and economic crises affecting the 
relative strength of parties in the short run.  
Following Martin (2000: 84-86, 422-427), we can distinguish three levels of 
analysis regarding the evolution of patterns of party competition, each of them being 
related to a theory that lays primary emphasis on them:  
(1) The long-term evolution of social structure, which is the primary focus of 
cleavage-theory. Here, the focus is on those critical junctures, such as the 
national and industrial revolutions, which heavily influenced political 
development in a path-dependent function. Following Allardt (1968), I would 
claim that the educational revolution of the 1960s and 1970s has constituted a 
further critical juncture (see also Knutsen 2002). Higher education fosters 
universalistic values, and the societal dynamics resulting from the stronger 
diffusion of such values has led to a counter-mobilization led by right-wing 
populist parties and to the emergence of a libertarian-universalistic vs. 
traditionalist-communitarian line of conflict in Western European party systems 
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(Bornschier 2005, 2007). Claims have been made that an additional critical 
juncture has been witnessed in the form of the processes of globalization and 
Europeanization that have intensified since the 1980s and 1990s (Kriesi et al. 
2006). In a somewhat different reading, Bartolini (2005) has argued that the 
lowering of national boundaries in Europe does not necessarily lead to a new 
line of opposition, but leads to a de-structuring of the functional cleavages at the 
national level.  
(2) These developments do not translate directly into new antagonisms within the 
party system due to the force of existing alignments and the freezing of party 
systems along historical divides. The established parties will seek to avert the 
entry of new parties by responding to new potentials within the electorate, 
within the limits set by their historical position. The adaptation of the existing 
structure of conflicts to new political potentials is the central focus of the theory 
of political realignments. The weakening of prevailing alignments and the 
emergence of conflicts cutting across a prevailing cleavage makes the electoral 
coalitions united by virtue of that cleavage break apart and opens the way for 
the establishment of new links between social groups and political parties. 
(3) The lowest level is that of everyday politics. Here, cyclical issues of minor 
importance, corruption scandals and the popularity or unpopularity of politicians 
and governments affect results of elections. Even if they dominate everyday 
politics, such events rarely affect the two higher levels of political development. 
 
In a restructuring of oppositions in a party system, levels one and two interact and 
therefore have to be analyzed jointly. A weakening of the grip of the established 
structure of conflict on voters is a precondition for a process of realignment to occur. 
As already pointed out earlier on, a dealignment can either be structural and 
behavioural (Martin 2000, Lachat 2004). In the case of structural dealignment, 
modernization leads to a long-term change in the strength of those social groups in 
which the old structure of conflict is anchored. Here, the long-term evolution of social 
structure situated at the first level impinge upon the second level, that of realignment-
theory. For example, the advent of a post-industrial economy has led to a shrinking of 
the traditional working class, while secularization has led to a decline in the share of 
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regular churchgoers in Western European countries. A party system reflecting 
primarily these conflicts will therefore be less rooted in social structure than a few 
decades ago, opening a window of opportunity for the mobilization of new conflicts. 
Processes of behavioural dealignment, on the other hand, are not necessarily 
connected to a gradual shift in the strength of social groups. Here, links between social 
groups and ideological party blocks formed by cleavages undergo change as a 
consequence of the rising importance of new political issues, the advent of a new 
dimension of political conflict, or because a party abandons its customary position. If 
the policy or value positions of an ideological block of parties and its voters no longer 
match, or if the electorate considers the political offer to be out-dated, the established 
links between parties and voters become fragile. A miss-match between the positions 
of parties and voters means that alignments may remain stable for some time due to 
habit, as long as voters do not redefine their political identity, but most likely, a 
realignment will occur. A process of realignment in this case requires a redrawing of 
individual’s personal group attachments. Because new identifications stand in direct 
competition with established group attachments, much depends on the latter’s salience. 
Behavioural realignments are therefore possible only as a consequence of a gradual 
transformation in individuals’ salience hierarchy of identities. 
Behavioural dealignment can, however, also be a consequence of politics itself. If 
political identities depend on conflict with opposing identities, as stated above, the 
decline of conflict between parties along any one cleavage will lead to a gradual 
weakening of the group identities underlying it. As a consequence, other identities can 
ascend in the salience hierarchy of identities. These can be existing identities, which 
were supplanted by the salience of new group attachments. Or they can be older group 
attachments, suppressed by the mobilization of the cleavages outlined by Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967), which now re-emerge. On the other hand, the fading of the identities 
linked to the traditional cleavages opens space for the emergence of new collective 
identities, crafted by political entrepreneurs. However, as the previous section has 
sought to underline, the possibilities of deliberate forging of new identities are subject 
to the limits of objective social or political similarities characteristic of the new 
constituency. 
Summing up the discussion so far, the programmatic content of party oppositions is 
relevant in two respects. First of all, conflict along the broad dimensions of opposition 
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reflected in the party system activates voters’ ideological schema (or cognitive 
representation of political space), and reinforces the established interpretation of what 
politics is about in the specific country. To the degree that parties adequately voice the 
preferences of their constituencies, the conflict over policy also keeps alive the 
antagonistically related collective (political) identities underlying divisions. At the 
individual level, conflict therefore renders salient voters’ group attachments and, 
consequently, their political identities, by which they can locate themselves in the 
ideological political space. Inversely, if a conflict is pacified, this leads to the dilution 
of the group identifications underlying it, and voters become receptive for new 
mobilization efforts, leading Kriesi and Duyvendak (1995) to suggest a zero-sum 
relationship between old and new divides. These mechanisms are displayed 
graphically in Figure 1, where the three levels correspond to the constituting elements 
of a cleavage as defined by Bartolini and Mair (1990). At the third level, however, I 
include the policy propositions issued by parties.  
 
 
Figure 1: Social structure, collective identities and their reinforcement by 
parties’ differing policy propositions 
 
The programmatic content of party competition can be the source of change of partisan 
alignments in still a different way, however. In the medium term, alignments can only 
be expected to remain stable to the degree that parties adequately represent the 
preferences of voters. In a dynamic interpretation of the Michigan School’s “funnel of 
causality” (Bornschier, Helbling 2005: 27-32), a mismatch in the positions of parties 
and voters can lead to a reconfiguration of partisan preferences. This is a second way 
how the programmatic conflicts in the party system impinge on the perpetuation of 
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cleavages. In terms of the three levels discussed earlier on, realignments then lead to a 
reconfiguration of the long-term alignments between social groups and political 
organization that are at the heart of cleavage-theory. 
In the short or even in the medium term, the absence of conflict between 
antagonistic ideological party blocks, or a mismatch in the positions of parties and 
voters should not lead to dramatic transformations in the of party system. This is 
because collective identities fade only eventually, and ideological schemas are not 
reconfigured in a day either. Understandings of politics therefore tend to reproduce 
themselves in a path-dependent manner (see Pierson 2000: 259-262). To the degree 
that the adoption of ideological schemas takes place in a political socialization process, 
as I have suggested, there is an element of inertia in them. This is because early 
socialization conditions later learning, and change is likely to be at least partially 
driven by generational replacement (Eckstein 1988). We should thus expect significant 
differences in the make-up of ideological schemas between cohorts, patterned by the 
structure of conflict individuals were socialized into when they entered the electorate.1 
Furthermore, voters have developed long-term loyalties to political parties, and 
continuity in voting behaviour may also occur as a habit.  
In all these cases, where the established conflicts have either been pacified, or 
parties no longer adequately represent their voters along the established or a new 
dimension of conflict, processes of dealignment and realignment are likely to occur. 
The established structure of conflict will fade eventually, especially if new parties 
represent the preferences of certain segments of the electorate more adequately. Based 
on these insights, we are now in a position to develop a typology of different types of 
divide that have varying consequences for the likelihood of new conflicts to emerge.  
 
 
                                                
1  Franklin’s (2004) finding that the evolution of electoral turnout can best be explained in terms of 
stable cohort patterns of political participation, which are shaped by a the level of activism when a 
cohort enters the electorate, supports such a view. 
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Cleavages and Lines of Conflict: A Typology of Alignments and Their 
Implications for the Mobilization Potential of New Conflicts 
 
Starting from the assumption that existing alignments condition the room for new 
conflicts to emerge, different types of cleavage are likely to have variable 
consequences for the mobilization capacity of new conflicts. While some cleavages 
may be at the centre of political disputes, others presumably have a more identitarian 
role, and stabilize alignments because the social groups divided by them (still) share a 
collective identity. Drawing on the work of Bartolini and Mair (1990: 19-52, 68-95), as 
well as Kriesi and Duyvendak (1995), we can differentiate cleavages along two 
dimensions, namely, salience and closure. Salience denotes the importance of a 
cleavage relative to other divides in a party system, while closure refers to the stability 
of the social relationship represented by the cleavage. Together, these elements 
condition the stability of political alignments. A cleavage, according to these authors’ 
conceptualization, is important if it structures party preferences to a high degree 
(relative to other cleavages) and if voters do not change allegiances for a party on one 
side of the cleavage to one belonging to the opposite camp.  
From Bartolini and Mair (1990), I retain the notion that the closure of social groups 
opposing one another along a line of cleavage can be analytically grasped by means of 
the stability of partisan alignments. Note that this implies a focus on politically defined 
collective identities, which are situated at a higher level of generality than the various 
group attachments and role identities underlying these political identities. The 
limitations inherent in cross-nationally comparable data preclude a focus on more 
specific social identities that are more intimately tied to social structure, and are central 
in the initial mobilization of cleavages.  
In determining the saliency of a divide, I depart from Bartolini and Mair in focusing 
on the polarization regarding the issues around which it evolves, using the differences 
between parties’ programmatic statements (instead of cross-cleavage volatility, where 
low levels can either be a function of virulent conflict, or of social closure, which have 
differing implications). If parties’ positions are far apart along a line of opposition, it 
represents a salient dimension within the party system. This follows from the central 
role I have attributed to political conflict in perpetuating cleavage structures.  
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In order to analyse political conflicts, I use the term line of opposition to denote an 
over-arching issue-dimension that structures party competition in a given election. 
Through its tight conjunction with the policy level of party competition, it denotes 
something distinct from a cleavage. Such a dividing line can, but does not necessarily 
reflect a cleavage. First of all, the number of lines of opposition does not necessarily 
coincide with that of the cleavages underlying the party system. However, they are 
likely to reflect the most salient cleavages. As we shall see, the economic and cultural 
dimensions characterizing party oppositions in Western European countries correspond 
rather closely to the divisions originally engendered by the class and religious 
cleavages. At the same time, a cleavage, as a (durable) pattern of political behaviour of 
social groups, linking them to specific political organizations, is something we do not 
necessarily encounter in everyday politics. For example, the centre-periphery cleavage, 
where it exists, may not find expression in a separate dimension of conflict, but is 
likely to be integrated in the main dividing lines that structure party interaction. 
As I have argued, the contemporary impact of the historical cleavages lies primarily 
in having shaped party systems in the crucial phase of mass enfranchisement and 
mobilization, which led to their subsequently “freezing”, and not so much in the 
immutability of a cleavage’s social structural basis. I therefore propose to lay primary 
emphasis on the stability of the links between social groups and parties, and pay less 
attention to the social structural homogeneity of the groups divided by a cleavage. A 
cleavage structure then denotes a durable pattern of political behaviour of socially or 
politically defined groups. In the model presented here, I regard the stability of 
alignments over time as the crucial factor distinguishing short-term alignments from 
cleavages. To the degree that we find the same lines of opposition in a number of 
consecutive elections, and if these divisions engender durable alignments, it is highly 
probable that they represent a cleavage. Unstable alignments, on the other hand, be 
they founded in social-structural divisions or not, are either short-term deviations from 
the established patterns of cleavage politics, or a herald of an unfreezing party system. 
If the proposition is correct that collective identities are reproduced by conflict, 
however, then cleavages that not even occasionally manifest themselves in politics are 
bound to fade.  
The next step is to relate oppositions in the party system to the attitudes of voters. In 
determining the chances for a realignment to occur as a consequence of a new 
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dimension of conflict, the match between the positions of parties and that of their 
respective electorates is crucial: It allows an estimation of the degree to which the 
party system is responsive to voters. Because the term cleavage has usually been 
reserved for relationships where political parties represent durable oppositions in the 
preferences of social groups, I consider a rough match in the positions of parties and 
their voters as a defining feature of a cleavage. Over the long run, a miss-match 
between the two will presumably lead to an erosion of the link between parties and 
their social constituencies. This leads to a waning of the cleavage and opens space for 
new alignments based on other group attachments.  
This results in an analytical schema combining three elements: (1) The polarization 
of parties’ positions along a line of opposition, indicating the salience of a divide. (2) 
The match between the positions of parties and their voters along this line of 
opposition, allowing an estimation of the responsiveness of the party system to the 
preferences of the electorate. (3) The degree of closure a division entails in terms of 
the organizational loyalties of social groups. Like Bartolini and Mair (1990), I am not 
interested in partisan loyalties to individual parties, but in the stability of preferences 
for ideological blocks of parties along a divide, which represent the broad divisions 
reflected in voters’ ideological schemas. Stable preferences indicate closure and 
strongly rooted political identities, while unstable preferences are an indication of a 
fluid line of opposition or cleavage. Closure gives an indication of the collective 
identity component of an alignment. If this component is strong, it will delay the 
manifestation of a new opposition even if parties have converged in their positions and 
if the conflict is pacified. Figure 2 shows the possible combinations of these three 
elements. The starting point for analysis is a single dimension structuring political 
competition in a particular election in a country. The analysis of a number of elections 
can then reveal either dominant patterns or evolutions in the types of divide. I now 
explain the content of the cells in the schema and briefly state what the implications of 
the various types of alignment are for the mobilization capacity of new political 
oppositions.  
Starting at the top left of Figure 2, we find a situation combining high party 
polarization and a match in positions of parties’ and voters, indicating that voter 
preferences are also polarized. With parties and voters being durably aligned along a 
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Figure 2: Types of divide as a function of polarization, responsiveness, and 
 social closure 
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line of opposition, this corresponds to a highly segmented cleavage. The term 
segmentation comes from depictions of consociational democracy and there denotes 
deeply rooted identities such as language or religion. However, following Mair (1997: 
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162-171), it can fruitfully be used for any deep political opposition entailing strong 
loyalties and party preferences of certain social groups. As a consequence, the electoral 
market is tightly restrained and leaves little room for the emergence of new lines of 
opposition or new political parties. At the extreme, such a structure of opposition rules 
out any real competition between parties. Political systems characterized by 
pillarization, where the Netherlands at least used to be a prominent example, each 
party has its own constituency, and they do not really compete at all. Presumably, 
therefore, this is the structure of conflict that most strongly inhibits the emergence of a 
new conflict at the centre of the party system. In this category we find on the one hand 
established cleavages that have either preserved their salience or have been 
reinvigorated by new issues, or, on the other hand, highly salient new divides that have 
come to structure politics. 
A corresponding case where preferences are volatile, exemplified by the field to the 
right, points to an emerging line of opposition. Competing with other, crosscutting 
divides, it lacks strong partisan loyalties. Voting choices are therefore dependent on 
the relative salience of this line of opposition as opposed to other divides in a given 
election. Should the division prove to be temporary, patterns of party competition will 
not change much. If, however, the conflict remains salient on the side of the voters, it 
is likely to lead to realignments resulting in a political structuring and then 
stabilization of alignments along this divide. The driving force of such realignments is 
either an outsider-party or an established party reorienting itself in order to attract new 
voters beyond its traditional constituency. 
Moving to the right, we find two situations of a mismatch between the positions of 
parties and voters. In both cases, parties’ positions are far apart on the dimension, but 
the party system is unresponsive to the positions of voters. Supposedly, these 
constellations are related to Katz and Mair’s (1995) thesis of party system 
cartellization. Cartellization can either refer to the established parties keeping specific 
issues off the agenda, a situation that will be dealt with in a moment, or to their ability 
to inhibit the entry of new competitors, partly due to their privileged access to state 
resources. The latter case, which may be termed organizational cartellization, is 
relevant for cases of polarized, but unresponsive party systems, where the established 
parties manage to restrict competition. At the same time, grass root party members or 
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parties’ clinging to their old core constituencies make impossible an ideological 
moderation. If alignments are stable, this indicates that parties either represent (i) an 
out-dated cleavage, which is pacified on the voter side, but still engenders loyalties, or 
(ii) that the dimension is of secondary relevance for voters who are more concerned 
with the stances parties take regarding a different dimension. As a consequence, the 
mismatch between voters’ preferences and the positions of parties does not lead to 
realignments. If, on the other hand, party preferences are not stable, the same situation 
has already led to a waning of partisan attachments. In this case, the hypothesis of a 
different political dimension stabilizing alignments can be ruled out – the party system 
does not reflect voters’ preferences and is unanchored in the electorate. Hence, the 
emergence of a new line of opposition is possible either due to the reorientation of an 
established party, or to the entry of a new competitor de-emphasizing the established 
line of opposition for the benefit of a new one. 
I now turn to the two cases in the bottom-right corner, where the party system is feebly 
polarized and at the same time fails to represent voters, implying that party electorates 
are characterized by more diverging policy preferences. This can be the case in two 
contrasting situations: Either the established parties have converged along a line of 
opposition and are thus unresponsive to their voters, for whom the dimension remains 
salient, as some would argue concerning the state-market dimension. The other 
possibility is that the established parties have not (yet) taken clear positions along a 
new dimension of political conflict. Parties can try to avoid doing so for various 
reasons, for example because they are internally divided concerning new issues, as it 
appears to be the case regarding parties’ stances towards European integration 
(Bartolini 2005). In these cases, where parties converge, while their electorates remain 
polarized, we have evidence for what I propose to call issue-specific cartellization. 
This is probably the most advantageous situation for anti-establishment parties to 
emerge, since they can on the one hand advocate programmatic positions that are not 
represented within the party system, and on the other hand denounce the other parties 
for not being responsive to the preferences of voters. In fact, this corresponds to a 
prominent explanation for the rise of right-wing populist parties in the 1980s (Katz, 
Mair 1995, Kitschelt 1995, Ignazi 1992, 2003, Abedi 2002). If party alignments are 
stable, and social closure is high, existing political identities will retard processes of 
realignment. But since the positions of the established parties are similar, and because 
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no visible policy oppositions or conflicts reinforce group attachments, existing party 
preferences can be expected to decline, opening the way for new conflicts to gain 
room. 
Finally, in those situations represented by the two bottom-left cells, the distances 
between parties are low. Congruence with their electorates’ preferences being given, 
this means that electorates are not far apart either. The first case is that of an 
identitarian cleavage, where party preferences are stable due to strong collective 
identities of social groups, constituting political sub-cultures. In either case, closure 
remains high due to enduring group attachments that carry the imprint of historical 
conflicts. But since the underlying collective identities are not reinforced by 
contrasting programmatic stances of parties, preferences are likely to remain stable 
only as long as new oppositions do not gain in importance relative to the old ones. 
However, even if this happens, and if the new oppositions crosscut existing 
constituencies, the rise of a new line of opposition will at least be tempered or delayed 
by the force of existing loyalties.  
A competitive political dimension, on the other hand, denotes a kind of competition 
that is close to Schumpeter’s (1942) characterization of party competition: Elections 
serve to elect competing teams of politicians that try to convince voters in the electoral 
market. In theory, as Downs (1957) has argued, this results in their targeting the 
median voter (but see Barry 1978 and Powell 2000). In a situation conforming to these 
criteria, voters can choose among parties by virtue of their performance in office. If 
new potentials were to arise, newcomers could in principle find fertile ground, because 
there is little in political identity to check the emergence of new conflicts. However, 
since the established parties do not have any strong links to specific constituencies that 
keep them accountable, they are relatively free to re-orient themselves and to absorb 
new issues, limiting the chances for challengers to gain success. An exception to this 
scenario would be if the established parties agreed not to address issues evolving 
around new oppositions, which would open space for anti-cartel parties. 
 
While the primary aim of this typology is to study patterns of opposition in the party 
system as a whole in a given election, it is applicable at various levels of specificity. 
On the one hand, one can move up to a more general level and identify dominant 
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patterns over a number of elections within a country. On the other hand, it is possible 
to move down and to characterize the more specific nature of oppositions for certain 
parties or groups of voters. For example, in cases of pillarization, a cleavage may 
continue to exist, but it is not necessarily relevant to the same degree for all voters. 
Thus, in cases of segmented political oppositions there is a certain danger of the party 
system not being responsive to those who are not integrated into the prevalent 
networks of societal and political opposition. Thus, such a structure of opposition will 
only inhibit the emergence of new conflicts if the party system also integrates citizens 
lacking strong political identities. The schema developed can also be applied to 
analyse the political behaviour of sub-groups of a party’s electorate, whose links to a 
specific party may be of different kinds. 
One of the problems involved in an analysis centring on parties and their respective 
electorates is that a non-responsive party system can generate both support for new or 
anti-establishment parties, as well as abstention from voting. For example, right-wing 
populist parties quite often seem to recruit their voters from previous non-voters, as the 
example of the French Front National shows (Mayer 2002). More generally, 
Goldthorpe (2002) has for instance argued that while class voting may be in decline, 
the relationship between class and non-voting may fortify as a result of the processes 
of modernization and globalization. Thus, any analysis seeking to gauge the chances of 
the emergence of new lines of opposition should keep an eye on non-voters. I will 
therefore take abstention into account when measuring the stability of alignments. 
 
 
Results from an Empirical Application of the Model to Political 
Oppositions in France, Switzerland, and Germany 
 
In order to demonstrate the feasibility of the approach laid out, I present some results 
in this section from an application of the analytical model to the study of patterns of 
opposition in three Western European countries, namely in France, Switzerland, and 
Germany. This analysis was undertaken in order to explain the emergence of right-
wing populist parties in France and Switzerland, while parties of this type have 
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remained largely without success in Germany (Bornschier 2007). The first step in the 
analysis is to determine the dimensionality of political space in the three countries, and 
to determine the lines of conflict underlying political competition. I then demonstrate 
how the ideological blocks along the resulting divides are identified and how the 
polarization of the party system and the match between the positions of parties and 
their voters are measured. For reasons of space, the presentation of the procedure is 
only illustrative, and I concentrate on the final results of the analysis.  
 
Determining the dimensionality of political space in the parties’ programmatic offer 
 
To be able to identify the lines of conflict structuring political competition in demo-
cratic elections, I rely on data based on the media coverage of election campaigns in 
six European countries. This data has been collected within the research project 
“National political change in a denationalizing world” (Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, 
Dolezal, Bornschier, Frey 2006). The data covers one election in the 1970s and three 
more recent elections that took place between the late 1980s and early 2000s. Parties’ 
programmatic offer is coded in the two months preceding each election. The election 
in the 1970s serves as a point of reference before the most recent restructuring of 
conflicts in Western European party systems took place. More specifically, in the 
1970s we expect a situation in which the first transformation of the traditional political 
space has taken place under the mobilization of the New Left. The second 
transformation, driven by the rise of the New Right, will be traced in the three more 
recent contests. For each election, we selected all articles related to the electoral 
contest or politics in general during the last two months before Election Day in a 
quality newspaper and a tabloid. The articles (and newspaper adverts in Switzerland) 
were then coded sentence by sentence using the method developed by Jan 
Kleinnijenhuis and his collaborators (see Kleinnijenhuis and De Ridder 1998 and 
Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001). This method allows a coding of the relationship 
between political actors and political issues. 
To code political issues, a detailed schema was used, distinguishing between 200 or 
more categories. For the statistical analysis, they were regrouped into 12 broader 
categories. In the following, the content of these categories is specified. All categories 
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have a clear direction, and actor’s stance towards them can be either positive or 
negative. The abbreviations in brackets refer to the ones used in later figures: 
 
Economic issues 
- Welfare: Expansion of the welfare state and defence against welfare state 
retrenchment. Tax reforms that have redistributive effects, employment programs, 
health care programs. Valence issues such as statements “against unemployment” 
or “against recession” were dropped if there was no specification whether the goal 
was to be achieved by state intervention or by deregulation. 
- Budget: Budgetary rigor, reduction of the state deficit, cut on expenditures, 
reduction of taxes that have no effects on redistribution. 
- Economic liberalism (ecolib): Support for deregulation, for more competition, and 
for privatisation. Opposition to market regulation, provided that the proposed 
measures do not have an impact on state expenditure – this is the distinguishing 
criterion from the Welfare-category. Opposition to economic protectionism in 
agriculture and other sectors. 
Cultural issues 
- Cultural liberalism (cultlib): Support for the goals of the New Social Movements: 
Peace, solidarity with the third world, gender equality, human rights. Support for 
cultural diversity, international cooperation (except for the European Union and 
Nato), support for the United Nations. Opposition to racism, support for the right to 
abortion and euthanasia and for a liberal drug policy. Cultural protectionism, 
coded negative: Patriotism, calls for national solidarity, defence of tradition and 
national sovereignty, traditional moral values. 
- Europe: Support for European integration – including enlargement – or for EU-
membership in the cases of Switzerland and Austria. 
- Culture: Support for education, culture, and scientific research. 
- Immigration: Support for a tough immigration and integration policy, and for the 
restriction of the number of foreigners. 
- Army: Support for the army (including Nato), for a strong national defence and for 
nuclear weapons. 
- Security: Support for more law and order, fight against criminality and political 
corruption. 
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Residual categories 
- Environment (eco): Calls for environmental protection, opposition to atomic 
energy. 
- Institutional reform (iref): Support for various institutional reforms such as the 
extension of direct democratic rights, calls for the efficiency of the public 
administration. 
- Infrastructure (infra): Support for the improvement of the infrastructure. 
 
 
The data are now analysed using Multidimensional Scaling (MDS), which results in a 
graphical representation of parties and issues in a low-dimensional space in every 
country. The grouping of the issues into economic, cultural, and residual categories is 
provided for illustrative purposes and does not determine the analysis. To give salient 
relationships between political actors and issues more weight than less salient ones, a 
Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling is used. There are always distortions 
between the “real” distances and their graphical representation in the low-dimensional 
space resulting from the MDS, but the weighting procedure ensures that the distances 
corresponding to salient relationships between parties and issues will be more accurate 
than less salient ones. The results thus take into account both position and saliency. 
In the three countries, political space proves to be clearly two-dimensional, since 
the move from a one-dimensional to a two-dimensional representation results in the 
clearest improvement in the goodness-of-fit of the solution. The results of the analysis 
are presented in Figure 3. Because the dimensions underlying the three campaigns 
between the late 1980s and early 2000s remain the same in every country, only the 
latest election is shown in Figure 3. It has to be kept in mind that the dimensions 
resulting from the MDS analysis are not substantially meaningful. The solution can 
therefore be freely rotated and it is possible to lay theoretically meaningful axes into 
the distribution. In the solutions, a first line has been drawn between “welfare” and 
“economic liberalism” as representation of the traditional state-market cleavage. The 
second line of conflict is a cultural opposition. As a consequence of the mobilization of 
the New Social Movements of the 1960s and 1970s, cultural liberalism has emerged as 
a polarizing issue already in the 1970s. The counter-pole is formed by budgetary rigor, 
law and order stances (“security”), or support for the army, all of which can be 
interpreted to represent a neo-conservative counter-pole to cultural liberalism.  
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Figure 3: Political space in France, Switzerland, and Germany, mid 1970s and 
late 1990s/early 2000s. Positions of parties and issue categories 
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In the more recent election, then, a common cultural dimension of conflict is visible 
that evolves around the cultural liberalism and anti-immigration stances. These two 
categories embody what may be called a libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-
communitarian line of conflict (Bornschier 2007). Cultural liberalism conveys both 
support for universalistic values, as well as the repudiation of the opposing normative 
ideals, namely, the defence of tradition, national sovereignty, and traditional moral 
values. Opposition to immigration and calls for a tough integration policy (denoted in 
the figures as “immigration”), on the other hand, captures stances regarding the theme 
the populist right has used for its construction of a collective identity based on the 
demarcation from people with cultural backgrounds different from that of the majority 
population. 
 
Measuring polarization, match, and the stability of alignments 
 
The next step in the analysis is to measure the positions of parties and the overall 
polarization of the party system along each of the two divides identified. Parties 
positions along a divide cannot be derived from the MDS-solution, and I therefore 
calculate their position regarding the two categories that make up the dimension. To 
have an overall measure of the degree of polarization a divide entailed in a particular 
election, the standard deviations of parties’ positions is a straightforward solution. In 
order to measure the match between the positions of parties and their electorates, the 
dimensions found to structure party interactions are reconstructed on the voter side 
using survey data. Most of the issue categories can be operationalized using demand 
side data, and I use principal component factor analysis to combine the various survey 
items that correspond to the categories into an index. Figure 4 shows the example of 
the cultural dimension in the French 1988 campaign (the bars under the positions of 
parties and electorates show the heterogeneity of the programmatic stances issued by 
parties or of the attitudes of their voters). The mean positions of parties and voters 
cannot be compared directly, because they have been measured on different scales, but 
it is possible to measure the congruence of representation by calculating the correlation 
of positions. Because the correlation taps only the covariance between positions, the 
differing scales are not a problem. The results from the correlations is displayed below 
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Figure 4. In the example, the match in positions is very high, indicating an almost 
perfect correspondence between parties’ and electorates’ positions, which is plausible 
when looking at their respective locations. 
In analyzing the stability of alignments between voters and parties, I am interested in 
the degree to which a line of opposition engenders loyalties, which indicate social 
closure of the groups divided by an opposition. Loyal voters are those who vote for a 
party belonging to the same ideological block in a number of consecutive elections. As 
urged before, it is crucial also to take into account non-voting, since abstention may be 
an antecedent to the reconfiguration of preferences. Loyalty in my conception then 
implies that a voter regularly turns out to vote for his/her ideological party block. The 
alternative measure, volatility, would only take into account those voters who actually 
shifted from one block to the other in two consecutive elections, while all those who 
did not vote in one of them would be excluded from the analysis. By focusing only on 
wholesale shifts in party preferences, volatility disregards possible erosions of loyalties 
that are more gradual, but nonetheless result in new political potentials. To measure 
the stability of alignments, I use recall questions from the surveys.  
 
 
match (5 parties): 0.98 
polarization parties: 0.73 
 
Figure 4: Positions of parties and voters, and identification of ideological blocks 
along the cultural dimension, France 1988 
 
Concerning the economic divide, two ideological blocks can be defined based on the 
sides they take with regard to the traditional class cleavage. The classification of most 
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parties is relatively easy using what Bartolini (2000: 10-11) calls a “genetic approach”, 
namely, identifying those parties as belonging to the left that have their roots in the 
process of lower-class enfranchisement and the rise of the class cleavage, characteristic 
of the structure of industrial conflicts. Bartolini’s classification thus provides a good 
starting point. The more difficult question concerns Christian Democrat and newer 
parties, in particular the so-called New Left parties and the populist New Right, which 
emerged since the late 1960s and are not the product of the conflicts of the industrial 
age. In most countries, Ecologist and New Left parties clearly have their origins in 
movements that are considered “movements of the left” (Kriesi 1999), but apart from 
this genetic criterion, I will also use parties’ empirically determined positions in 
political space for the classification. The Swiss Christian Democrats cannot be 
assigned to the left or right block and therefore form an ideological block of their own 
(see Frey 2006). 
The identification of the relevant blocks along the cultural dimension is more 
difficult, because we do not have established criteria such as those relating to the class 
cleavage and the economic dimension as a starting point. From the theoretical point of 
view, we can expect up to four blocks along the cultural divide: (1) New Left parties, 
(2) the classical parties of the left, (3) those of the established right, and (4) New Right 
parties, represented by the populist right. The distinguishing criterion of the two new 
party families is that they take extreme positions regarding the new cultural dimension 
of conflict and also primarily mobilize along this dimension, but have a rather 
indeterminate position with regard to economic conflicts (Bornschier 2007). 
Empirically, not all of these blocks may be discernible in every country. Furthermore, 
the distinction between Old Left and New Left is not necessarily an easy one, since 
New Left parties can either be newly founded parties such as the Ecologists, or result 
from the transformation of an older Socialist party. To define the blocks, I therefore 
use the empirically discerned distances between parties’ and voters’ positions along 
the cultural dimension. Large gaps between mean positions and low levels of overlap 
in the spread around these positions indicate a segmentation of competition. If such a 
pattern is manifest over at least two elections, it seems reasonable to consider the 
parties separated in this way as belonging to different ideological blocks.  
In the example shown in Figure 4, three blocks can be identified. First of all, 
because neither the positions of parties, nor those of their electorates reveal a divide 
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between Old Left and the New Left, and because the overlap is especially large on this 
side of the spectrum, the left as a whole constitutes the first block (PCF, PSF, extreme 
left and Ecologists in the example). The second block is made up of the established 
right, the RPR and UDF. Finally, because both the Front National, as well as its voters 
lie far away from the established right, the populist right forms a New Right block of 
its own. Based on this classification, the share of voters can be calculated that chose 
the same party in the preceding election and in the one under study, resulting in the 
measure for the stability of alignments. Table 2 shows the ideological blocks identified 
in the analysis of the four election in each of the three countries. In Switzerland and 
Germany, the patterns of opposition in the 1970s do not reveal clearly discernible 
ideological blocks, and the analysis therefore begins in the 1990s.  
 
 
Table 2: Ideological blocks along the economic and cultural dimensions of conflict in 
France, Switzerland, and Germany 
 State-Market-Cleavage Cultural divide 
France Left: Extreme left, PCF, PSF,  New Left: Extreme left, PCF, 
1978-2002 Ecologists, MRG  PSF, Ecologists, MRG 
 Right: UDF, RPR/UMP, Centre-right: UDF, RPR/UMP 
 Front National New Right: Front National 
Switzerland  Left: Extreme left, Social , New Left: Extreme left, Social  
1991-1999 Democrats, Ecologists Democrats, Ecologists 
 Christian Democrat: CVP Centre-right: CVP, FDP (liberals) 
 Right: FDP (liberals), SVP New Right: SVP, other extreme  
  right parties 
Germany Left: SPD, Ecologists New Left: Ecologists 
1994-2002 Right: CDU/CSU Old Left: SPD 
  Right: CDU/CSU 
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Types of divide in France, Switzerland, and Germany 
 
We now have the three elements necessary to classify election according to the 
analytical model summarized in Figure 2: Polarization, match, and stability. Figure 5 
shows the nature of economic conflicts in the three countries studied in one election in 
the mid-1970s and three more recent elections. For ease of representation, only the 
first two elements of the model are shown, namely, the polarization of the party system 
and the match between the positions of parties and their electorates, which indicates 
the responsiveness of the party system to voter preferences. The resulting four 
quadrants correspond to four basic types of divide, each of which is further 
differentiated in the full model according to the stability of alignments that the line of 
conflict entails (see Figure 2). The grey lines indicate (admittedly arbitrary) cut-off 
points for the classification which are, however, only used as rules of thumb.  
 
 
Figure 5: Patterns of opposition along the state-market cleavage 
in France, Switzerland, and Germany 
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While there are elections in which the match in the positions of parties and their 
voters is somewhat lower, the state-market cleavage represents an identitarian divide in 
most cases by virtue of medium to low levels of polarization and rather responsive 
party systems. While voter loyalties to the ideological party blocks defined by the 
state-market cleavage continue to be strong (see Figure 6), economic conflicts have 
therefore not been very strongly reinforced by political conflict already in the 1970s, 
and the situation is similar one or two decades later. Switzerland is an exception to this 
general picture, in that the party system was first unresponsive in the 1970s and then 
became more strongly polarized along this dimension than in the other countries at the 
end of the 1990s. 
The state-market cleavage is thus kept alive by the relatively strong political 
identities associated with it, rather than by segmented patterns of opposition. For those 
parts of the electorate that do not have strong allegiances to the left and right economic 
blocks, however, the economic divide is likely to have evolved into a competitive 
political dimension, where the performance of governments is decisive for voting 
decisions. In the long run, as established political identities fade, this is what we would 
expect for the entire electorate. In France, an overall decline in the stability of 
alignments to these blocks has already been witnessed since the 1970s, while they have 
remained rather stable in the other countries. Loyalties related to the state-market 
cleavage have thus delayed, but not organized out completely the rising prominence of 
political identities related to the new cultural divide. 
As Figure 7 reveals, patterns of opposition have become more segmented along the 
new cultural line of conflict than along the economic divide in Switzerland and France. 
In both countries, alignments were still structured by the religious and class cleavages 
in the 1970s, and the manifestation of the left-libertarian agenda in party competition 
first led to a loss of responsiveness of their party systems, and then to reconfigurations 
of partisan alignments and parties’ political offer. By the 1990s, under the impact of 
the mobilization of the populist right, a three-block structure has emerged in which the 
poles are constituted by the left-libertarian and the traditionalist-communitarian blocks, 
with the centre right squeezed in the middle. At the end of this process of party system 
transformation, parties closely mirror the positions of the electorate. Right-wing 
populist parties are an integral part of a segmented pattern of oppositions in 
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Switzerland and France, and clearly have an electorate of their own in ideological 
terms. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Stability of alignments along the economic and cultural dimensions 
(measured as the percentage of voters who chose a party from the same 
ideological block in two consecutive elections) 
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Figure 7: Patterns of opposition along the cultural divide in France, 
Switzerland, and Germany 
 
The comparison between those two countries where the populist right has been 
successful with the case of Germany reveals interesting differences in the patterns of 
competition. In contrast to France and Switzerland, party oppositions in the 1970s  
were segmented along a libertarian-traditionalist line of conflict in Germany. While 
retaining responsiveness in the later elections, the party system has become less 
polarized in two of the three more recent elections, however. With the exception of the 
1998 campaign, the pattern of oppositions has been rather centripetal in Germany. In 
the absence of a strong right-wing populist challenger, the two major parties of the left 
and right have succeeded in keeping polarization low along the cultural divide of the 
1990s, while strong political identities related to the left and right ideological blocks 
stabilize alignments (see Figure 6). Because the Union parties have retained the 
ownership of the issues related to traditionalism and immigration, and have the 
continuing ability to rally voters holding traditionalist-communitarian preferences, the 
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structural potentials related to the new cultural conflict manifest themselves in 
tempered form in Germany. However, even in this country, it is not the state-market 
cleavage that hinders a polarization and subsequent segmentation along the new 
cultural divide, but rather the strategies of the established parties of the left and right. 
In France and Switzerland, on the other hand, where the populist right has made its 
breakthrough in the 1990s, the segmented pattern of oppositions along the cultural line 
of opposition suggests that the phase of realignment has come to an end. Right-wing 
populist parties in these two countries command the highest loyalties of all ideological 
blocks along the cultural dimension, and it is unlikely that their voters should abandon 
them all too soon. For those who have been socialized into the new structure of 
conflicts, cognitive representations of politics centre on cultural, and not economic 
antagonisms. Considerable parts of the Front National’s electorate acclaim Jean-Marie 
Le Pen’s statement that the terms of left and right have become meaningless and that 
the real antagonism has to do with identity. Consequently, the cultural antagonism is 
not only the more salient divide for the voters of the populist right (Bornschier 2007), 
but it is also likely to remain more important for them than the state-market cleavage. 
What is more, given the strength the populist right has reached, it is rather improbable 
that disputes over the proper definition of binding norms, over what constitutes the 
basis of the national community, and over the challenge posed to national sovereignty 
by European unification should recede all too soon. Political conflict will therefore 
reinforce the collective political identities underlying the antagonism between 
libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The first goal of this chapter has been to develop a conceptual framework for the 
analysis of cleavage-formation at the individual level. I have intended to show that 
using concepts from social psychology, these processes can be fruitfully studied at that 
level. The distinction put forward between structural and collective action potentials 
allows an assessment of the chances of structural conflicts being politically mobilized. 
Thus, my aim was both to challenge reductionist views that consider it sufficient to 
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define political potentials in social structural terms, as well as to offer analytical tools 
to incorporate the element of collective identity into the study of political cleavages. 
While collective identity is a constituting element of Bartolini and Mair’s (1990) 
widely accepted definition of a cleavage, it is all too often left aside in empirical 
analysis due to the difficulties of measurement, a partial exception being Knutsen and 
Scarbrough (1995). While this is on the one hand due to a lack of appropriate data, a 
problem that is not easily resolved, shortcomings can on the other hand be traced to a 
lack of appropriate analytical tools. For this reason, I have attempted to grasp 
collective identities at the individual level in this paper, hoping to contribute to the 
integration of the collective identity dimension into the study of cleavage mobilization. 
Both the traditional class and religious cleavages, as well as the more recent divide 
based on the conflict between citizens holding libertarian-universalistic and those 
defending traditionalist-communitarian values, have emerged due to the interplay of 
common value priorities, integration into social networks, and the deliberate moulding 
of collective identities by political elites. Social structure and individual identities have 
to interact to enable the formation of collective identities that result in collective action 
potentials. However, to assess the mobilization capacity of a new conflict, we also 
have to take into account how firmly group members are still rooted in social identities 
related to older oppositions. In order to develop a model that takes into account the 
interplay of old and new conflicts, the first step is to develop a proper understanding of  
how exactly European party systems have “frozen” into place in the 1920s.  
Beyond shedding light on the way old cleavages are perpetuated in transformed 
form, the second central task of this paper has thus been to develop a typology of 
divides with varying consequences for the emergence of new lines of opposition. To 
the degree that established cleavages entail collective identities and provide cognitive 
schemata for the interpretation of politics, they condition the room available for the 
articulation of new conflicts that cut across the old divisions. Again drawing on social 
psychology, I have argued that a central mechanism shaping and reinforcing collective 
identities and ideological schemas is political conflict. It is therefore essential to link 
historical cleavages to the policy level of oppositions in party systems, over and above 
the three constituting elements of a cleavage suggested by Bartolini and Mair (1990). 
Finally, to illustrate its empirical applicability, the model has been applied to the 
transformation of Western European party systems as a result of the emergence of new 
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value-based conflicts since the late 1960s. The analysis shows that the state-market 
cleavage remains one of the two major dimension of conflict in these party systems. As 
the same time, Western European party systems have been altered as a result of the 
mobilization of a new cultural conflict that opposes libertarian-universalistic and 
traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of justice and community. Given its 
importance in political competition and the strong loyalties it entails, this conflict has 
evolved into a cleavage that has displaced the religious opposition as the second 
cleavage dimension in various Western Europe party systems. However, depending on 
the nature of the established cleavages on the one hand, and on the strategy of the 
established parties on the other, the opportunities for right-wing populist parties, whose 
rise is related to the emergence of this new cleavage, have varied. While the established 
parties of the left and right in Germany have prevented a segmentation along the new 
cultural cleavage and have contended the right-wing populist potential, right-wing 
populist parties have entrenched themselves firmly in the French and Swiss party 
systems. They contribute to and are an integral part of the segmented nature of the new 
cleavage in these countries.  
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